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Abstract
Across different traditions of social research, the study of science exhibitions has 
often taken the form of an ‘object-oriented’ inquiry. In this tradition, actor-network 
theory (ANT) has focused on how the processes of exhibiting objects mediate 
relations between science and society. Although ANT has not developed as a 
theory of curating, it nonetheless contributes to revaluing the work performed by 
curators in relation to the practice of science. This article describes an ethnographic 
engagement with a curatorial experiment in a science museum which staged a 
‘multi-viewpoint’ exhibition of an object. A display of an object ‘in process’, I take 
the opportunity of this curatorial experiment to explore analogies drawn in ANT 
studies between museums and laboratories in attending to the ways that curatorial 
practices mediate science. I ask whether, and to what extent, ANT can account for 
curating as a material practice that not only participates in domesticating objects 
for science but also in problematizing, multiplying and redistributing relations 
between objects and the social.
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Introduction
‘There isn’t much science in the Science Museum’. This phrase was both a frequent complaint I 
heard when talking to people about the ethnographic study I was conducting at London’s Science 
Museum, and a regular trope in light-hearted discussion with the curators I was following. If its 
task were the representation of the vast gamut of ‘the sciences’, it is perhaps not unsurprising 
that the Science Museum would invariably fail to deliver. How could one museum possibly 
deliver such a feat of representation as to capture the whole body of changing knowledges, 
practices and problems of the sciences? From such a standpoint, the Science Museum would 
indeed appear rather provincial: the objects it exhibits come mostly from collections dominated 
by industrial history and medicine, and its interactive exhibitions often engage visitors not in 
pure science but with complex socio-technical problems. The Science Museum has often been 
said, not least by its curators (Morris 2010), to convey a historically specific idea of science 
which derives, in part, from its earlier history as a museum managed by a department of 
state. But science in this setting has many other attachments too. Walking to the Museum it 
was impossible not to notice the queues of tourists that gather on Exhibition Road and I was 
continually reminded that the exhibition of science was not confined only to the galleries inside 
this austere building: as a tourist attraction, the exhibitions of the Science Museum also circulate 
globally and bring together actors from across many varied and changing societies. Despite 
representing an institution that speaks in the name of Science, I was surprised at how few of 
the curators I met during my study seemed invested with normative, demarcationist, views of 
science as a rational enterprise inhabiting an irrational social world. Their bookshelves were 
filled with publications from across sociology, cultural studies, science studies, social history and 
they often seemed to have more expertise in social theory than I held, as a visiting sociology 
PhD student. And yet, there seemed a strange agnosticism among the curators, at least in their 
conversations with me, about how big theories of science related to the name of the setting 
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where they worked. If the Science Museum is a setting in which relations between science 
and society are curated, the curators often seemed rather reluctant to consider themselves 
spokespersons for Science.
This article takes the occasion of a curatorial experiment at London’s Science Museum 
to open up the question of the relations between curating and ‘object-oriented’ sociology, 
with a specific focus on actor-network theory (ANT). ANT has long been deployed in both 
sociology and social studies of museum (for instance, Hetherington 1999), often under the 
rubric of a material ‘turn’ in social research which shifts the analytical focus of object-oriented 
research from the study of ‘products’ to the ‘processes’ through which objects materialize in 
social practice (this ANT argument is most directly made in Latour 1988). ANT is particularly 
pertinent when considering the practice of curating in science museums, which across various 
traditions of social research have long been characterized as institutions that exhibit the most 
domesticated scientific products. In what might be called ‘product’ theories, science museums 
are located at the far end of object trajectories that begin with practices of the sciences and 
which lead to the circulation of new facts and artefacts in society. In such theories the science 
museum is marked by its distance not only from the practices of science but also from 
processes through which new things emerge in societies. Science museums in this product 
model are conservationist in orientation and curatorial activity is assumed to be the concern of 
maintaining established settlements between science and society, whether through education, 
interactive display or cultural initiatives. Product theories of the science museum are widely 
associated with particular schools of social criticism: for instance, that the science museum 
represents the world instrumentalized and objectified, or conversely, that the science museum 
is the materialization and protection of reason against the irrational forces in societies. Product 
theories might be said to be widely found in sociological traditions such as interactionism which 
treats the products of science as those things domesticated as the furniture of social life and 
in positivism for which scientific objects constitute the very reality of social associations. The 
product theory of the science museum, in this sense, might be said to hold a long-standing 
position within the discipline of sociology.
By contrast, ANT studies suggest that science museums do not only occupy the end 
point of the social trajectory of a scientific object but rather are settings where the relations 
between science and society are materially tested and ordered in curatorial practice. ANT 
proposes that objects of the kind we find in science museums are rarely as neat and closed as 
product theories suggest. Rather than ‘products’, then, ANT therefore suggests that scientific 
objects are better understood as ‘quasi-objects’1. ANT argues that the material strength of an 
object is not pre-determined before it enters society but is rather subjected to continual testing 
as it circulates in different social settings. Scientific objects might appear as closed products 
when they are socially stabilized but are better understood, according to ANT, as long chains 
of socio-material relations that cut across science and society. For ANT, scientific objects 
do not simply arrive in society from nowhere but are rather made social through the work of 
‘mediators’, actors that operate in between science and society to produce relations between 
them. The representation of a scientific object is always, in ANT, an act of its mediation. What 
kind of mediators, then, are science curators? 
In what follows I discuss a curatorial experiment that I followed as a participant-observer. 
In this experiment a variety of groups participated in curating a ‘multi-viewpoint’ exhibition of 
an object. The Science Museum’s professional curators did not use the language of ANT to 
describe this experiment, although they certainly were not unfamiliar with it. However, the 
multi-viewpoint exhibition seemed to me, in many ways, to stage a distinctly ANT-like display: 
offering a processual view of the object and foregrounding its mediations by heterogeneous 
actors. In this article, I use the occasion of this curatorial experiment to explore ANT’s account 
of scientific objects and ask how objects are mediated in the process of curating exhibitions. 
The article first introduces the curatorial experiment and its object, a recently rediscovered 
synthesizer, and I discuss some of the particular ways in which the synthesizer was mediated 
in the curatorial experiment. Specifically, I argue that this experiment served to problematize 
the work of curating, to multiply the participants who might be considered mediators, and to 
redistribute the work of curating science. In the following section I discuss ANT’s account of 
the science exhibition. Specifically, I attend to two related claims of ANT: first, that objects are 
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never univocally scientific but are always ‘quasi-objects’ – complex mixtures of science and 
society – and, second, an exhibition can be understood as a ‘test’ of an object that is necessary 
for it to be accommodated in the common world. In the following discussion I engage with the 
proposition made in some ANT-studies to draw an analogy between the laboratory and the 
museum, as equally social settings that participate in the material production of science. In 
concluding, I question to what extent such analogies might be said to contribute to revaluing 
curatorial work as material practice and propose opening up the question of the ways in which 
exhibitions participate in socially domesticating scientific objects.
The multi-viewpoint exhibition 
As an ethnographer, I followed the work of curators at London’s Science Museum as they 
experimented with developing what they would regularly refer to as a ‘multi-viewpoint exhibition’. 
The object of the exhibition was a recently rediscovered electronic music synthesizer built in 
the early 1960s by the composer Daphne Oram (1925-2003): the Oramics Machine. Although 
the Oramics Machine appeared far from a conventional scientific product, the Machine was 
not ‘un-technical’ and was, for instance, described by some participants as an example of 
early computation techniques in electronic music (Grierson & Boon 2013). In preparing the 
multi-viewpoint exhibition, the curators at the Science Museum had conducted a series of 
experiments using participatory procedures which they called ‘co-curation’ 2 techniques, and 
through which groups with a variety of social identities, technical competencies, knowledges 
and practical experiences of electronic music were invited to contribute material for the gallery 
display of the Oramics Machine. The Museum’s curators included historical researchers and 
museum participation specialists and were using the curatorial experiment both as a method for 
inquiring about what they termed ‘public history’, concerned with the different kinds knowledge 
about the history of science and technology held by non-experts, and with the development of 
new forms of participation in the museum. The multi-viewpoint exhibition was thus an event 
which appeared ‘multiple’ even in the curators’ own accounts of it. 
Curatorial experiments, particularly in science museums, have often taken place ‘behind 
the scenes’ (MacDonald 2002), where controversies are hidden from the public view. But such 
front-stage/back-stage boundaries were considerably blurred in the case of the curatorial 
experiment discussed here. Indeed, in many instances it appeared that maximum publicity 
was a central pillar of the Science Museum curators’ approaches to experiment, multiplying 
the ways in which the experiment was publicized and mediated. At each end of the gallery 
display, for instance, text graphics informed visitors that the exhibition they were about to 
visit was experimental in character. In the gallery, a film staged an interview with one of the 
curators describing the curatorial approach taken, and the groups that participated in curating 
the exhibition’s displays. In the film, the curator elaborates the process:
The Oramics exhibition is the first exhibition in the Public History Project and 
we’re planning two others. Co-curation, participation, co-creation; [this approach 
is] not having the curator saying “here is the gospel come and read it” but instead 
bringing in people like our visitors to work on the development of the Museum’s 
cultural offer.
As the curator speaks, the films shows a group of people standing around the Oramics Machine 
peering with intrigue at its various component parts and discussing its place in electronic 
music history. In various parts of the film, participants offer their reflections on the curatorial 
process, and I am even featured in the film as a participant with one of the co-curating groups; 
as a participant-observer, my relation to the curatorial experiment was also complicated by 
the multi-viewpoint staging of this exhibition3. Making visible both the curators and presenting 
the Oramics Machine in the process of being prepared for public display, the gallery display 
appeared to unsettle distinctions between exhibition procedures and products that have often 
framed practices of curatorial experiment. 
Science museum galleries have often provided settings for experimental exhibitions: 
having been widely used as the stages on which experimental instruments, techniques and 
findings are publicised (Hooper-Greenhil 1992)4; they have also served as the end point of 
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the development of experimental curatorial procedures in science museums (MacDonald 
2002); and, galleries have also provided the controlled settings in which experiments can be 
conducted in public (Weibel & Latour 2007). Arguably, all three versions of the experimental 
exhibition were present in the case discussed here. The Oramics Machine was an experimental 
instrument in multiple senses, but perhaps most notably as a musical instrument. The gallery 
also clearly provided the end point for the experimental ‘co-curating procedures trialled by the 
Museum’s professional curators. And, the experimental gallery display was also publicized as 
such to those visiting it. The multi-viewpoint gallery display might therefore be said to have 
been multivalent as an experimental science exhibition, enacting multiple versions of what 
was experimental about the exhibition and the settings where the experiment was happening.
At the centre of the gallery, the Oramics Machine seemed far from an arbitrary choice 
for the experiment. Although its inventor, Daphne Oram, had founded the first public electronic 
music studio in the UK – the Radiophonic Workshop at the BBC, which she left shortly after 
it opened – she had much less subsequent success in demonstrating the Oramics Machine 
as an innovation in electronic music. Oram realized only a handful of compositions on the 
Oramics Machine, which effectively never left her home-studio. Until its rediscovery, there 
were almost no publicly available recordings of the Oramics Machine and less than a handful 
of books about the history of electronic music had mentioned it, most of which were authored 
by close associates of Daphne Oram. Media coverage for the exhibition further dramatised the 
Machine’s alterity from the world of scientific products foregrounding the fact that the Oramics 
Machine was rediscovered rusting in a barn in rural France. After a complicated conservation 
process, the pieces of the Oramics Machine on display comprised a coherent assemblage, 
though one still distant from a completed product: the frame of the Machine assembled from 
repurposed metal shelving, a wooden cabinet housing one part of the machine was for most 
of the exhibition labelled ‘commode’, and a broom handle was conspicuously jammed in one 
side of the Machine. On one side of its exhibition case a text label stated that the Oramics 
Machine would never again work and this seemed corroborated by the plethora of colourful 
wires that hung unconnected from the Machine’s body, surrounded by open circuitry still exposed 
and corroded, and a switch which appeared alongside a handwritten label: ‘do not switch’. 
Somewhere between unattainable aspiration and laboured materialization, the rediscovered 
Oramics Machine seemed less the revival of forgotten innovation and more the recovery of 
something distinctly incomplete, still ‘in process’.
The curators made no secret of their delight at the Oramics Machine. In a video 
accompanying the Oramics Machine’s gallery display, one curator enthused: 
The discovery of the Oramics Machine has been one of those great events in a 
curator’s working career. It’s a real bit of home brew. Just by looking at it you can 
tell that it was always work in progress, that it was always being modified, and it’s 
unique. Daphne Oram is an absolute gift to an exhibition-maker.
The curator’s enthusiastic description of the Oramics Machine seemed to revel in its ‘non-
product’ status. The Machine is in quite a literal sense ‘home brew’, having been constructed 
in Oram’s home-studio: a converted oast house in rural Kent. The curator’s narration of the 
Machine here is perhaps notable for the ease with which they shift between the object, the 
context of its invention (Oram’s home) and to the inventor herself. Such ‘shiftiness’ I found 
was apparent throughout the exhibition, not least in one of the main publicity images which 
showed Oram composing with the Machine in her home, drawing wavy lines onto strips of film 
that run across its surface: foregrounding neither composer, machine or the domestic context 
but rather staging their relations, such publicity offered distinctly opaque and unconventional 
images musical practice and technological operation.
Right from the start of the ethnographic study, when I found myself following one of 
the curators to an experimental music venue on the opposite side of London to the Science 
Museum where one of the curators presented the proposal for the curatorial experiment 
and exhibition, it seemed clear that the Oramics Machine afforded the possibility of taking 
curatorial practice ‘outside’ the museum site. In between presentations about the Oramics 
Machine by a computer scientist, a sonic artist and a music journalist, the curator discussed 
the acquisition of the object and invited the assembled crowd to participate in the experiment. 
Laurie Waller: Curating actor-network theory: testing object-oriented sociology 
in the science museum
197Museum & Society, 14 (1) 
Although at this early stage in the ethnography I’d been principally following the work of the 
curators at the main site of the Science Museum, in South Kensington, this event seemed 
to demonstrate the way in which the Oramics Machine might also afford the exhibition of the 
curatorial experiment in other sites. 
During the experiment I was invited to become participant in a group of musicians to 
select different inventions from electronic music history for a case display. Discussions about 
the Oramics Machine during this process often concerned the Machine’s relation to other DIY 
musical instruments, early synthesizers and the broader ethic, common to much experimental 
art, of working with material constraints. While the co-curating sessions took place in the 
Science Museum and the gallery, it was striking that many members of this group seemed 
actively engaged in the work of multiplying the media of the curatorial experiment: for instance, 
several of the participants blogged during the various stages of the process, one member of 
the group did a radio show about it, another produced a subsequent exhibition of materials 
from Daphne Oram’s archive, one member published a magazine article on the exhibition, 
a few participants in the group lent and even built instruments for the exhibition, and others 
used their social media accounts to publicise the opening of the exhibition. The work of the 
‘co-curators’ appeared to mediate the Science Museum’s exhibition of the Oramics Machine 
such that it was happening in multiple sites, many of which were distinctly removed from the 
gallery display in South Kensington. 
By contrast with the group of musicians, when I interviewed members of other groups 
involved in curatorial experiment, the Oramics Machine seemed mediated as something quite 
different. One striking example was the staging of a series of texts in the gallery by anonymized 
‘women writers’5. In an interview, a creative writer who had been contracted by the Museum 
to run workshops with a group of writers described to me how the process had focused not 
specifically on the Oramics Machine but on Daphne Oram and on broader questions of sonic 
invention. In fact, in the women writers’ texts almost no references appeared to the Oramics 
Machine as musical instrument, and instead the texts seemed to present the Oramics 
Machine by proxy through the lived experience of its inventor Daphne Oram and references 
to the home-studio environment in which she worked to create new sounds. In the Science 
Museum’s gallery display, questions of gender and exclusion were quite literally dramatised in 
the presentation of the texts as recorded audio performances of monologues, each narrating 
personal experiences through a lone female voice. These displays seemed to mediate the 
Oramics Machine as a ‘social’ object that both dramatised what has been called the ‘woman 
question in science’ (Harding 1986) while also performing a particular kind ‘cultural inclusion’ 
that has been common to both science and the museums.
Yet another mediation of the Oramics Machine could be found in an interactive application 
designed by computer scientists at Goldsmiths College London, who had worked with the 
Science Museum’s curators to acquire the Oramics Machine. In interviews I conducted with 
these researchers, the discussion centred on the electro-mechanical design of the Oramics 
Machine and questions about the relation of the Oramics Machine to developments in voltage 
controlled sound-synthesis. I later visited one of the researchers at their studio as they were 
building a prototype of a ‘mini’ version of the Oramics Machine that Oram had developed plans 
for but never realized. The researcher went on to demonstrate this in various locations that 
included academic seminars, experimental music venues and concert halls. Research on the 
Oramics Machine as a computing machine was not taking place in a traditional engineering 
institution but rather between the Science Museum’s conservation labs where the Oramics 
Machine was being restored, the arts college where Oram’s archive was held, the studio, and 
music performance venues. 
Finally, in discussions with the Science Museum’s curators about the significance of the 
Oramics Machine there seemed to be a refusal on their part to instrumentalize the Oramics 
Machine as an object for publicizing a ‘complete’ science. An email discussion with one of the 
curators involved offers one such instance:
Was the Oramics Machine important as an invention? Maybe not, but it is 
important in the sense that it says so much about the inventiveness and creative 
minds that were involved in electronic music in those early years. And it’s a nice 
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counterbalance for the idea that it’s a masculine story involving knobs, dials and 
an emotionless process. I think museums should talk about dead-ends quirks and 
failures a lot more. They are part of the history of Science, Technology, Engineering 
and Medicine and can help us see the big stories in a different, more diverse and 
balanced light. (personal communication from a curator, 10/09/2012) 
In this example, the curator puts questions about innovation, that have often dominated 
discussions about science museum objects, to one side in order to talk about their interests 
in the modes of cultural creativity that developed in 1960s electronic music studios, and in 
(feminist-inspired) critiques of the gendering of science and technology. Rather than engaging 
in tired questions about innovation, the curators seemed simply to make a ‘redistributive 
move’ to show that such binary questions had actually a much richer life at the intersection of 
epistemic, technical, cultural and museological problematics.
As an ethnographer I found it impossible to follow all of the ways in which the Oramics 
Machine was mediated in the multi-viewpoint exhibition. Post-product accounts of science 
museums, like ANT, impress on the researcher to attend to the ways in which relations 
between science and society are stabilized and domesticated in these settings. And yet, in 
following the making of this multi-viewpoint exhibition it seemed that the curators were more 
concerned with provoking and unsettling the question of the Oramics Machine’s relation to 
science at every opportunity. When I would discuss this with the curators, they would explain 
to me that the exhibition of the Oramics Machine was extremely peripheral to the mainstream 
work of the Science Museum: it was poorly funded, developed within an extremely short time 
frame, and, as one put it, was ‘hardly particle physics’. If the Oramics Machine was unsettling 
relations between science and society, it did little upset the exhibitions about industrial history, 
technical pedagogy displays and ‘hands-on’ interactive installations of the contemporary science 
galleries surrounding it, and for which this Science Museum is well known. The multi-viewpoint 
exhibition seemed, in some ways, simply an attempt to add one more style of gallery display to 
the Museum’s existing repertoire; to multiply the possible genres of science curating that could 
be developed in this setting. Indeed, its peripheral character seemed evident as I followed the 
curators and the participants in the experiment out into a host of settings of practice, distant 
from those of conventional science. The peripheral character of the curatorial experiment in the 
Science Museum was, in this boundary-testing sense, precisely why it seemed an interesting 
test case for ANT theories of science exhibition.
Actor-network theory and the curator as mediator
Actor-network theory does not have a well-developed account of curating. However, public 
exhibitions of experiments have occupied a central focus in ANT studies in demonstrating the 
work of mediating science (Latour 1993b). Public exhibitions of experiments have long been 
central to the task of demonstrating that facts can be disentangled from the local sites of their 
production and can circulate in society (see also Shapin & Schaffer 1985). The experimental 
exhibition has, in science, therefore often been considered an event that participates in the 
socialization and domestication of experimental entities. In describing the work of assembling 
exhibitions as mediating relations between science and society, ANT has, I suggest here, 
contributed to the revaluing of work of science curating as a practice that does not simply diffuse 
ready-made facts into society but rather as a process that mediates an experimental entity 
in a way that could be said to be continuous, rather than radically separate from, laboratory 
practices of experiment. 
Actor-network theory is far from the only critique of ‘product’ theories of the science 
museum. Empirical studies have widely described science museums as settings that not only 
hold the socialized products of science but are also settings where relations between science 
and society are produced in practices ranging from collaborative research (Star & Griesemer 
1989) to taxidermy (Haraway 1984) to design and advertising (MacDonald 2002). In such 
studies we find a range of ‘non-productized’ accounts of the objects found in science museums, 
including: boundary objects that contribute to the formation of scientific fields (Star & Griesemer 
1989); epistemic objects that order relations between experts and publics (MacDonald & 
Silverstone 1992); and artefacts that render social relations as material culture. In none of these 
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accounts can the science museum simply be consigned to the end of a continuum between 
science and society. Rather, by opening the black-box of product theories, empirical studies 
have shown that science museum can be many things, including: a context for research and 
site of discipline formation, an arena in which the politics of knowledge is played out, and a 
location where nature is materialised as culture. By attending to the diversity of object-oriented 
practices found in science museums, and the social roles that these objects can perform, 
they highlight the artifice involved in producing relations between science and society. Few 
of these studies directly deploy ANT, and indeed some of these studies developed important 
critiques of ANT (for instance, Star & Griesemer 1989). I focus on ANT here because, in so 
far as it has been specifically concerned with describing the work of assembling experimental 
exhibitions, I suggest it can be considered an approach that also participates in revaluing the 
practice of curating. 
The portrait presented here of ANT’s accounts of assembling exhibitions is therefore 
not a complete museum theory of curating, which would include many other practices through 
which curators care for objects that are less directly related to formal exhibition procedures 
(although in my experience, the curators carried concerns about display with them even when 
engaged in other kinds of object practices). In what follows I highlight two key features of ANT 
studies that distinguish the role of the curator as a mediator that assembles exhibitions and 
participates in socializing experimental entities. First, ANT argues that scientific objects are 
never simply as univocal or closed as product theories would propose but are rather ‘quasi-
objects’: complex mixtures of both science and society. The process of exhibiting objects cannot 
be only an individual or institutional concern, but rather collective and distributed: in processes 
of exhibition experimenters are obliged to take into account the other actors concerned by 
the object. Second, ANT argues that experimental exhibitions are not discontinuous with, 
or radically separated from, the practices of science, but that they are ‘tests’ of the material 
strength of a laboratory apparatus. Assembling an experimental apparatus for exhibition is, 
ANT suggests, a process that ‘mobilizes’ the apparatus between social spaces and produces 
socio-material change in the object. In at least these two senses, I suggest, ANT is a theory 
that proposes a revaluing of curatorial work.
ANT’s theory of ‘quasi-objects’, a concept proposed by the philosopher Michel Serres, 
concerns the problem of how social actors represent natural things (Latour 1993b). Is it only 
scientists that can truly represent natural objects, as product theories would suggest? ANT 
argues that as the sociologist gets closer to the processes of science they can see more clearly 
that objects are never purely natural. Studying the controversies, disputes, breakdowns and 
failures in science, ANT studies highlight that the processes through which nature materializes 
as something objective are thoroughly social. It is only when sociologists are distant from 
such processes that science and society appear easily separable, and therefore that the 
representation of objects as univocal natural things might appear uncontroversial (Latour 
1988). The theory of the quasi-object is, in this sense, an argument against the notion that 
science and society comprise ontologically discreet domains within which objects must be 
positioned. Rather, attending to the quasi-object requires following the processes through 
which differences between science and society are produced, such as in science exhibitions.
Minimally, we might say that curators are actors that, though processes of assembling 
exhibitions, make objects speak in the name of science. Where product theories would propose 
to radically separate practices of exhibiting objects from the processes through which they 
are made, ANT’s quasi-object theory suggests that the work of curating exhibitions in the 
name of science should not be considered an activity that is discontinuous with the practices 
of scientists. To limit the work of curating to the ‘after-care’ process following the successful 
production of the object would considerably undervalue the role played by curators as not just 
spokespersons for science but as mediators. ANT’s theory of quasi-objects would therefore 
suggest that curating, as an object-oriented practice, does not take place on one side of a 
divide between science and society but rather takes place in between these two spheres. 
The curator, in other words, appears as one mediator who along with many others practically 
participates in the fabrication of an object. Of course, the curator of exhibitions in science 
museums is a long way from the laboratory where objects begin their life as experimental 
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entities. Nonetheless, curating exhibitions of laboratory inventions can never, in ANT, be 
considered entirely discontinuous from the experimental apparatuses and practices through 
which they were produced. The curating of experimental exhibitions does not occur after the 
end of the experiment but is rather, ANT proposes, a process that mobilizes the experimental 
apparatus and puts it to material test.
The notion that curating exhibitions might be considered as processes that ‘test’ an 
experimental apparatus is, in ANT, linked to the sociological problem of how experimental 
entities come to be materially stable such that they can circulate in society. Studies of the 
failure of researchers to domesticate their objects of study have occupied a central place in 
this broader ANT problematic of describing how scientific objects acquire material strength 
(Callon 1980; Callon 1986; Latour 1996). More than simply an event in which a completed 
experiments are communicated and facts diffused in public, ANT has described the exhibition 
as a test that demonstrates the material strength of the experimental fact; it is an event in 
which the instruments, devices, procedures – in other words, the whole laboratory apparatus 
– is submitted to heteronomy (Latour 1993b). In ANT the appearance of experimental facts as 
knowledge that can exist independent of a material apparatus is an accomplishment of exhibition 
practices. ANT studies therefore highlight that experimental facts are thoroughly material things 
but that when demonstrated in exhibitions they acquire a virtual and immutable character that 
enables their circulation beyond the material setting of their making. The public demonstration 
is for ANT therefore part of an experimental trajectory through which a fact becomes a social 
entity. Deploying ANT in accounting for the experimental exhibition is, in this sense, to unsettle 
accounts of science exhibitions that assume we can clearly separate laboratory work from the 
work of exhibition or the practice of experiment from the publicity of facts. 
ANT conceptualizes the processes through which facts acquire strength and social 
stability in terms of the materialization of virtual networks of humans and nonhumans. The 
role of exhibition in this process was given a detailed description in Bruno Latour’s (1993a) 
account of the invention and domestication of microbes by Louis Pasteur. Latour highlights 
that there was nothing inevitable about the invention of the microbe: the problems which 
Pasteur’s microbiology claimed to address were also the domain of the large French hygiene 
movement. Pasteur’s microbes only became strong, Latour argues, in public exhibitions that 
demonstrated the microbiology he had developed was not only convincing in the safety of a 
well-equipped Parisian laboratory but could equally well travel to the sheep farm at Pouilly-
le-Fort. The provincial spectacle of the isolated rural farmyard, Latour suggests, is crucial to 
demonstrating to large social groups such as government ministers, the livestock industry 
and the Society of Agriculture the fact of the microbe. The public exhibition on the sheep farm 
therefore proposed new alliances of humans and nonhumans to be added to those enrolled 
in the Paris laboratory testing and increasing the strength of the microbe’s network such that 
Pasteur’s vaccination techniques could circulate widely. To accomplish this, Latour argues, 
Pasteur did not leave his Parisian laboratory behind but rather bought it with him to Pouilly-le-
Fort: in demonstrating the vaccination of sheep he was mobilizing the whole material apparatus 
implicated in the laboratory experiments. Curating the experimental exhibition was therefore a 
trial not just of the reality of the microbe but of the extent to which Pasteur’s laboratory could 
travel in all its materiality from Paris to the rural sheep farm. In ANT, then, the curating of 
experimental exhibitions are processes of assembling networks of humans and nonhumans 
that comprise a laboratory apparatus, materially testing these relations and participating in 
their social domestication. 
Quite a different ANT account of science exhibition, in comparison to Latour’s study of 
Pasteur, is found in Tony Bennett’s (2004) study of Pitt-Rivers’s evolutionary exhibition practices. 
Unlike many ANT studies, Bennett’s is not directly concerned with the experimental laboratory 
sciences. Rather Bennett’s discussion of Pitt-Rivers’s curatorial practices is situated in relation 
to the roles played by museums from across the historical sciences (but notably, archaeology, 
anthropology and natural history) in producing an evolutionary synthesis of natural, geological 
and human time that could be mobilised within projects of colonial governance and administration. 
Though Bennett’s is a study specifically concerned with the historical sciences, which have not 
been principally laboratory sciences, it is notable that he nonetheless proposes an analogy 
between the laboratory and the museum (see also Bennett 2005). Drawing on ANT, Bennett 
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argues that the ‘black-boxing’ of evolutionary time across the historical sciences was, in part, 
facilitated by curatorial practices of typologically arranging objects such that human cultures 
could be materially sequenced and demonstrably ordered. The typological display had two 
main attributes, Bennett argues, that contributed to the black-boxing of evolutionary thought:
First, it made it theoretically possible for all museum collections to be reassembled 
in accordance with the same principles through the operation of a common 
grammar across all museum types...the whole of the material world could be lined 
up and placed before the eyes in a manner which allowed each display to tell its 
own story, seemingly without the need for textual mediation. It promised a means 
of making each object auto-intelligible through the place that was arranged for 
it within an evolutionary sequencing of things that was – to come to the second 
point – cumulative. (Bennett 2004: 65)
Bennett takes Pitt-Rivers’s development of typological techniques for classifying objects as 
the paradigmatic example. The famous sequential typologies of Pitt-Rivers’s ethnological 
collections entailed, Bennett argues, not only the imposition of cultural order onto a collection 
of curiosities. It was also a process that made possible the production of relations between 
people, things and environments as ‘cultures’ that could be ordered in evolutionary sequences. 
To appreciate the typological object exhibition as a curatorial accomplishment, Bennett 
suggests that we cannot simply stay in the museum gallery. Instead, the sociologist must follow 
the distributed networks of humans and nonhumans, to the far-flung colonial outposts, that 
facilitated the collection and ordering of these objects as evidence of cultural development. 
To appreciate the role of exhibition practice in assembling and ordering these distributed 
networks in typological displays, Bennett invites us to attend to the exhibition as a controlled 
environment for testing anthropological propositions and as a setting in which anthropology 
could be materially demonstrated as an evolutionary science. As Bennett’s analysis highlights, 
ANT provides a way to account for how disordered materials – in Bennett’s case the jumble 
of cultural artefacts collected by Pitt Rivers – can be rendered through curatorial practices as 
stable objects and ordered facts.
In so far as science museums exhibit objects in the name of science, ANT proposes 
a sociology of curating in which the latter is seen as materially mediating relations between 
science and society. ANT might therefore be said to have contributed to the current re-
valuing of the work of curating, demonstrating that the work of assembling exhibitions can be 
considered to be in particular respects continuous, rather than radically removed from, the 
practices of science. In this sense, ANT’s account of curating might be also said to draw on an 
older use of the term in the history science to refer to the work of assembling the experimental 
apparatus for public demonstration. What distinguishes the curator of exhibitions from other 
mediators of science, in ANT, are the ways in which practices of exhibition involve testing and 
stabilizing objects, and participates in socially ordering facts. It is only by attending to the work 
of mediators like curators, ANT argues, that we can appreciate the strength of scientific facts 
to compel broad social assent. 
Museums and laboratories
ANT’s process sociology of curating, as I have rendered it, makes clear that it is not so much 
the object ‘in itself’ that is the focus of curatorial practice so much as the apparatus to which 
it is attached. ANT suggests that in curatorial practice it is not so easy to distinguish the ‘hard’ 
from ‘soft’ aspects of the apparatus; that the object ‘in process’ of being curated is slippery 
and difficult to easily separate from the context of the experiment or from the identity of the 
experimenter. As noted above, in the curatorial experiment I followed, it seemed hard at times 
to pin down exactly what the object of the experiment was: the Oramics Machine seemed at 
once a musical instrument, a museum object, an engineered machine, an amateur invention, a 
studio proto-type. Indeed, the staging of the multi-viewpoint exhibition seemed to make clear the 
difficulty of cleanly separating the Oramics Machine from the curatorial apparatus or questions 
about its context in the Science Museum. In many ways, then, the exhibition of the Oramics 
Machine could be said to enact many of the features of an actor-network theory of curating.
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Debates about ANT’s theory of mediation have highlighted the centrality of the laboratory 
as the paradigm of material practice of science (Guggenheim 2012; Hess 2013; Latour 
1999). Certainly in the case of Pasteur, as described by Latour, the laboratory was central to 
the curatorial problem of exhibiting the microbe: assembling the exhibition at Pouilly-le-Fort 
was in Latour’s account a problem of mobilizing the laboratory apparatus from Paris to this 
rural setting. In the context of museum studies, Bennett is not alone in proposing an analogy 
between the museum and the laboratory (Bennett 2005; Kraeftner et al. 2007; Macdonald & 
Basu 2007). One of the key insights of laboratory studies was indeed to highlight the ways 
in which laboratory settings provide for the practical establishment of multiple viewpoints on 
experimental objects (Knorr-Cetina 1999; Latour & Woolgar 1986, Lynch 1985). The Science 
Museum’s curators’ staging of the ‘multi-viewpoint’ exhibition of the Oramics Machine might 
therefore seem to suggest once more the pertinence of analogies between the museum 
gallery and the laboratory as settings of experiment. To draw an analogy between the museum 
and the laboratory would suggest not only that there is continuity between the practices of 
scientists and science curators but also in the objects with which they are concerned and the 
apparatuses they develop.
In the conventions of the ‘product’ sociologies that ANT would purport to critique, the 
staging of the Oramics Machine as an incomplete object for science would not distract sociological 
attention from the ‘hard’ social consequences of the exhibition. Such theories would surely 
point out the instrumental value of staging the Oramics Machine as an incomplete object for 
science in accomplishing particular institutional ends: for instance, to stage a culturally inclusive 
display of science or to demonstrate the museum as an interactive public institution. Though 
the Oramics Machine may look fragile in the gallery display, product theories might suggest 
that the object is in fact much ‘harder’ than it looks. Indeed, such observations would seem not 
insignificant as insights into the multi-viewpoint exhibition as a social process: the gendered 
staging of the ‘women writers’, for instance, could well be said to be a highly opportunist and 
instrumental staging of cultural inclusion. In this sense, such ‘old’ sociological materialisms do 
not appear entirely irrelevant for appreciating the fragile condition of the Oramics Machine or 
its cultural and public significance in relation to the institutions of science and museology. ANT 
is surely right about many of the shortcomings of materialist sociologies in failing to adequately 
account for the processes through which scientific objects acquire their material force, and why 
a materialist account of science would require sociological attention to the work of curators as 
mediators. And yet, the seeming relevance of these ‘old’ sociological materialisms appeared 
to highlight that if this multi-viewpoint exhibition enacted some aspects of an ANT account of 
object exhibition it also seemed to unsettle clear distinctions between ‘product’ and ‘process’ 
that form the basis of ANT’s object-oriented sociology. 
There were many ways in which these tensions between ANT’s distinction between 
product and process could be said to have played out between object, the exhibition and 
the curatorial apparatus. The exhibition might well have tested the material strength of the 
Oramics Machine as an object for science, as ANT suggests, but it also seemed hard to 
imagine that the Oramics Machine might have ever failed given its staging as an object that 
was never fully realized by its inventor, that never left the studio where it was prototyped and 
was never demonstrated as an innovation. ANT would suggest that the continuing ambiguity 
of the Oramics Machine as an object for science might somehow put at risk the identity of 
the curators exhibiting it or at least stimulate some form of controversy. However, notably few 
‘science warriors’ emerged throughout the duration of my study at the Museum; despite its 
seeming alterity as an object for science, the Oramics Machine was in many senses distinctly 
uncontroversial as an exhibition proposition in Science Museum. The exhibition therefore 
seemed neither a prelude to establishing the Oramics Machine as a univocal scientific object 
nor a process of ‘sorting out’ relations between science and society. Neither was it clear that the 
curatorial apparatus provided the means through which the object acquired material strength 
and through which distributed relations between science and society were assembled. Certainly, 
the Oramics Machine has subsequently widely circulated among the different communities of 
actors concerned with electronic music history and its exhibition often provides a significant 
point of reference. If the curatorial experiment with the Oramics Machine was a test that 
participated in the object’s socialization, it nonetheless problematized the work of curating, 
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multiplied the actors mediating the process, and redistributed the problem of the staging the 
Oramics Machine in the name of science.
How useful is the laboratory analogy in accounting for such difficulty in distinguishing 
between ‘product’ and ‘process’ accounts of scientific materialism? Does the laboratization of 
the Science Museum allow that curators might be more than simply mediators that participate 
in domesticating ‘hard’ science? Perhaps. But, in many ways the Oramics Machine would seem 
somewhat strange object to ‘laboratize’ precisely because its exhibition appears to afford the 
possibility of curatorial experiment that subverts many of the tropes of institutionalized, pure, 
and professionalised science. Indeed, the contrary dynamic of ‘de-laboratization’ (Guggenheim 
2012) might provide a perfectly adequate characterization of this exhibition as a staging of 
science: foregrounding the studio as a setting of invention and celebrating undisciplined 
technical practices, the aesthetics of machines, and the misuse of instruments. 
I suggested earlier that ANT’s account of curating science appears to revive an older 
account of curating from the history of science. This is perhaps instructive for highlighting 
some limitations of a laboratory-centric model of curatorial practice (e.g. Latour’s Pasteur). As 
Shapin (1988) has highlighted, the curator was a figure that became an expert of experimental 
demonstration by rehearsing ‘at home’. Moreover, for the sake of the experimental apparatus’ 
safety, public demonstrations were, in fact, often conducted in domestic settings. The curator, 
thus, was a figure whose domestic labour needed to be made invisible for the purposes of putting 
science on public display. Paradoxically, in the history of science, public demonstrations could 
be staged as the social ‘domestication’ of new facts precisely because they were founded on 
a division of labour that made invisible such domestic work involved in curating experiments 
(see also Hacking 1983). Treated as a mediator, ANT proposes a ‘coming out’ for the curator 
from behind the scenes, as a participant in socio-material processes that produce collectives. 
Does ANT’s revaluation of curating also, then, unsettle this social division of labour between 
domestic and public spheres? Assembled in Oram’s home-studio, there is a certain irony in the 
domesticated staging of the Oramics Machine precisely because it appears to expose such 
labour; the household furniture and the broom handle of which it is comprised are particularly 
obvious signifiers of an approach to invention shaped in many ways by domestic necessity 
(Waller 2015). To laboratize the curatorial experiment would seem not simply to overlook the 
pertinence of alternative settings of experiment, such as the studio, but would also seem to 
repeat a kind of androcentrism by instituting a division of labour in which some forms material 
practice and androcentrism mediation are valued more than others. If Pasteur’s curatorial 
experiment with the microbe centred on the problem of mobilizing the Parisian laboratory to 
the rural setting, the exhibition of the Oramics Machine would seem to centre on something of 
an inversion of this problem: that of mobilizing the home-studio where the Oramics Machine 
was assembled from the rural setting of Oram’s residence in Kent to the Science Museum 
gallery where it could staged in the name of science. 
Conclusion: curating after ANT
As settings of exhibition, ANT would thus propose that the sociologist approaches science 
museums not as sites where rationality is defended or institutions that represent the world 
objectified and instrumentalized, but rather as settings where associations between science and 
many very different things are materially produced. As I walked around the different galleries 
of the Science Museum, during this ethnographic study, it was hard not to be impressed by 
how such heterogeneous instruments, machines, aesthetic styles and cultural events all 
appeared to somehow ‘hang together’ in the name of science. The observation that ‘there 
isn’t much science in the Science Museum’ in this sense seemed less a damning criticism of 
the institution than an appreciation that assembling so many very different things to speak 
in the name of Science involves quite considerable artifice. The reluctance of the curators to 
consider themselves as representatives that speak for science seemed not an obfuscation of 
a professional duty but rather to acknowledge that the material accomplishment of the Science 
Museum does not reside in a particular ontology of the objects they hold in collection but rather 
is assembled in exhibition practices that perform the work of proposing new associations for 
science. It only takes a brief skim through the Science Museum’s corporate literature to find 
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the range of associations including national museums, scientific institutions like CERN, and 
government representatives, but also ‘women’, ‘BME communities’, and ‘the arts’. ANT offers 
a neat way of sociologically characterizing the science museum not as simply an institution 
that represents the sciences but as a setting in which heterogeneous associations of science 
materialize.
The ANT move from ‘products’ to the ‘processes’ was not new to object-oriented sociology; 
arguably, social research traditions as diverse as social constructivism, Marxism or material 
culture could all be said to have developed versions of this argument. ANT criticised these other 
object-oriented sociologies as not being radical enough in applying this move to society itself: 
arguing that they wrongly maintained society as the object of study for social science when 
they should have been studying the modes of associative action from which societies emerge 
(Latour 2005). ANT proposed that sociologists need not to choose between different accounts 
of social objectivity or ontology but rather to follow the processes through which the social is 
materially assembled. In attempting to follow the mediations of the Oramics Machine in this 
curatorial experiment, I have suggested here that ANT might not have renounced commitments 
to social objectivity or ontology quite as thoroughly as has often be claimed by its advocates. 
Specifically, if ANT privileges the laboratory as the paradigmatic setting where the material 
world is mediated, it would therefore seem to propose a benchmark against which the material 
claims of all other mediators compare. Curators of science are not laboratory scientists but 
they nonetheless often mediate the same objects and apparatuses: to what extent does the 
laboratory help analytically distinguish the specific modes of mediation performed by each actor 
without reintroducing a priori materialist distinctions separating scientific from social work? I’ve 
suggested that one way to extend the project of revaluing curating would be to open up the 
‘domestic’ problem in curating: not simply bringing the laboratory into the museum in order to 
free the Science Museum’s curators from the charge of domesticating the Oramics Machine, 
but to ask whether we might also have underappreciated the domestic work of exhibition.
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Notes
1 The concept of ‘quasi-objects’, coined by the philosopher Michel Serres, was most broadly 
developed by Bruno Latour (1993b), one of the founders of actor-network theory. Latour 
argues that quasi-objects are: ‘much more social are much more fabricated, much more 
collective than the ‘hard’ parts of nature, but they are in no way the arbitrary receptacles of 
a full-fledged society. On the other hand they are much more real, nonhuman and objective 
than those shapeless screens on which society – for unknown reasons – needed to be 
‘projected’ (1993b: 55). 
2 ‘Co-curating’ was not the only concept used by the Museum’s curators, but it is the one that 
I draw on here for the purposes of this discussion of curatorial work. Some of the groups 
participating groups are discussed below.
3 I discuss this point further below. As an amateur electronic musician I was able to join one 
of the groups with little difficulty; indeed, doing so unsettled distinctions between my own 
professional sociological commitments in the setting.
4 There are long standing debates among science museum professionals about the problems 
of displaying experimental practices ‘in process’ as well as their results (Durant 1992). 
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5 In their staging of their works in the Science Museum’s gallery the writers were explicitly 
gendered as a group.
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